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abStract
This paper considers long term processes of financialisation in the former 
and post-Yugoslavia. Regional monetary policy has since the 1980s defended 
the value of credit money in order to facilitate international capital flows. It is 
argued that the monetary system of fixed exchange rates, inflation targeting 
and capital account liberalisation has institutionalised the subordinate finan-
cialisation and dollarization of the region. However the origins of dollarization 
are found in the historic dependency of the productive sector on foreign cur-
rency credit imports.
Keywords: Financialisation; Dollarization; Euro; Transition Economies; 
Southeast Europe. 
reSumen
Este artículo analiza el proceso de financiarización a largo plazo en la ex- y 
en la post- Yugoslavia. Desde 1980, la política monetaria regional ha defen-
dido el valor del dinero crediticio de cara a facilitar las entradas de capitales 
internacionales. Defendemos que el modelo monetario basado en tipos de 
cambio fijos, metas de inflación y liberalización de la cuenta de capital ha 
institucionalizado la dolarización y la financiarización subordinadas en esta 
región. Sin embargo, los orígenes de dicha dolarización se encuentran en la 
dependencia histórica del sector productivo de créditos para la importación 
denominados en divisas.
Palabras clave: Financiarización; Dolarización; Euro; Economías en tran-
sición; Sudeste europeo.
JEL codes: P2, F31, F33, F36.
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1. introduction
The aim of this paper is to consider the role of monetary policy in engineer-
ing the subordinate financialisation and dollarization of the post-Yugoslav re-
gion. In studies of the region, dollarization, or currency substitution, is consid-
ered primarily as the result of the historical loss of confidence in the national 
currency as a store of value due to long periods of macroeconomic instability 
involving high inflation rates (Becker, 2007, Pepić, et al., 2015). According to 
the quantity theory of money, inflation derives from the excessive supply of 
money by governments, for example, in order to cover budget deficits. By con-
trast, we subscribe to the post-Keynesian view that money is endogenous and 
demand-determined and thus that the central bank cannot fully control the 
supply of money. From this perspective, we seek to go beyond recent hetero-
dox accounts that emphasise the perverse consequences of regional monetary 
policy in creating overvalued currencies that promote financial imports over 
industrial exports (see e.g. Radošević, 2015). Such accounts make a significant 
concession to the quantity theory of money by accepting that macroeconomic 
policy is primarily concerned with price stability rather than supporting the 
circuit of dollarized credit money. This paper takes inspiration from the late 
Suzanne de Brunhoff’s (1967, 1971, 1981, 1986, 2005) reconstruction of the 
Marxian theory of commodity money for an age of inconvertible, state-backed 
credit money. Here international money, central bank money and the deposits 
of private banks must be linked by monetary policy to one another in terms 
of money’s function of general equivalent so as to enable the mutation from 
one form of money into another (de Brunhoff, 1971). Drawing on this work,  it 
is argued that the monetary regime of regional financialisation is designed to 
enable credit money to function as measure of value and means of payment, 
to preserve finance capital imports from devaluation or default. 
However, we reject the tendency to reduce processes of dollarization and fi-
nancialisation to particular policy regimes. The problem is an ahistorical meth-
odology, proceeding from the idea of a transition to the market commenc-
ing ab initio in 1989, ignoring “longue durée” regional processes of market 
and financial integration, and issuing in ‘varieties of capitalism’ (see Bohle and 
Greskovits, 2007, Drahokoupil, 2009) or forms of ‘dependency’ (see Nölke 
and Vliegenthart, 2009) as potentially varied as there are national units. In-
stead, we consider contemporary monetary policy in relation to the historical 
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evolution of capitalism as a monetary economy of production and circulation. 
Its regional origins are located in the crisis of liquidity of the productive sec-
tor and the conversion of fixed assets into credit money and foreign currency 
flight capital; and its role is to anchor the flux and reflux of flows of dollarized 
credit money. This historically-informed perspective guides our usage of the 
potentially vacuous term “financialisation”. The latter usually implies a dichoto-
mous view of the relationship between production and finance, as in the idea 
of a shift from productive to financial investments, (see e.g., Duménil and Lévy, 
2011). In fact, the challenge is to explain transformations in the financing of 
capital accumulation and how these in turn modify the operation of non-finan-
cial firms and the crisis tendencies of capital (Toporowski, 2016). Hence, the 
term financialisation will refer descriptively to regionally specific forms of finan-
cial liberalisation, based on the integration of households (Lapavitsas, 2013) 
and non-financial companies into financial markets, and firmly rooted in the 
inter-relationship between production and finance. 
2. marx’S ‘monetary theory oF credit’1 and reGional dollarization 
We begin by drawing out the relevance of Marx’s theory of the general 
equivalent for an age of dematerialised state-backed credit money. For Marx, 
commodity production poses the problem of the social validation of private la-
bours incorporated in different commodities. Money appears as the commod-
ity that expresses the relative value of all the others, as a general equivalent. 
It is only as a socially accepted measure of value that money can function as 
an unit of account and thus as a means of circulation. And it is only with the 
dangerous leap that is taken during the exchange of the commodity against 
money that private labour shows its properly social character. However, a capi-
talist economy is more than just a commodity economy. Money is advanced 
as money capital for the purchase of labour power to produce commodities for 
sale at a profit. The money capital that sets in motion the monetary circuit is 
usually advanced by a holder of money reserves at a rate of interest represent-
ing a claim on surplus value, and on this basis a credit system emerges, spe-
cialising in the management of money capital, to replace the monetary system 
as an agent of accumulation (de Brunhoff, 1981). 
In Marx, credit is deferred payment within commodity exchange. Thus, the 
‘monetary constraint’ or sanction can be provisionally deferred. Credit is a so-
cial relation different to the one between buyers and sellers originating in com-
modity exchange. Here, instead of money effecting direct social validation of 
private labours, it is a private relation that only becomes indirectly socialised 
because of the productive activities it serves to finance, otherwise remaining a 
private convention between bank and borrower (de Brunhoff, 1971). However 
economic crisis reveals that money is not in its principle identical with credit, is 
1 See, de Brunhoff (1967).
121
Revista de economía mundial 46, 2017, 117-134
FinanciaRización en la Región de Post-Yugoslavia: Política monetaRia, dineRo cRediticio Y dolaRización
no mere unit of account of prices or debt: credit money no longer appears as 
a pure unit of account within a closed circuit and promises to pay are replaced 
by demands for hard cash, for money as a store of value. In the present crisis, 
quantitative easing is precisely a social validation of devalued credit money via 
its ‘conversion’ into, that is articulation with, central bank money. 
Thus the normal functioning of the monetary system requires reciprocal 
convertibility of the different forms of money in usage, including the credit 
flows (bills, cheques, securities, etc.) between commercial banks, financial mar-
kets and enterprises (de Brunhoff, 1971). Credit money can only assume its 
contemporary function of general equivalent when its convertibility into any 
commodity corresponds to the convertibility of different sorts of money be-
tween each other (de Brunhoff, 1971). Convertibility requires the existence of 
a central bank as pivot of the credit system (Marx 1991), and specific institu-
tional relationships between central banks and commercial banks that guaran-
tee liquidity in credit crises. The structure of payments is dominated by central 
bank money (notes and reserve deposits) against which scriptural money (sight 
deposits in private banks) is issued: credit money thus represents a promise to 
pay the liabilities of the central bank. 
The role of monetary policy is not only to assure the general and unre-
strained convertibility of monies within the national economy, but also that of 
domestic against foreign currencies, for the purposes of international transac-
tions, through different exchange rate regimes; and in the face of international 
capital movements, which can result in the devaluation of the national currency 
and alter the conditions of convertibility between equivalents. We will argue 
that post-Yugoslav monetary policy is geared to the conversion of international 
credit money into domestic credit money so that it may operate as the meas-
ure of value, unit of account and means of payment in dollarized economies. 
Fixed exchange rates formally preserve the value of international credit money 
by insulating it from exchange rate risk and transferring currency mismatch to 
borrowers. Following the quantity theory of money, central banks accumulated 
foreign currency reserves in order to sterilise excess liquidity caused by foreign 
currency imports. However, foreign currency purchases merely increase the 
liquidity of the banking sector, fuelling a carry trade chasing cross-currency 
yield differentials (Gabor, 2010). In our terms, this financialisation of banking 
is the outcome of the defence of the exchange rate peg in order to enable for-
eign currency imports to function as domestic credit money. Before developing 
these points further we turn to the historical origins of regional financialisation 
and dollarization in the dependence on capital imports and illiquidity of the 
socialist firm.
2.1. the illiquidity oF the SocialiSt Firm and dollarization
The Yugoslav system of ‘self-management’, combining national planning 
with market decentralization of decision making, was predicated on world mar-
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ket integration to import the finance and capital goods necessary for export 
growth. In the crisis of the 1970s, faced with exclusion from EEC markets, 
enterprises borrowed heavily in dollars, via the domestic banking system, from 
the international banks to finance capital goods imports. Between 1973 and 
1979 investment spending rose from 32.2% to 37% of total social output 
(Palairet, 2007). The finance-led investment boom was derailed by the inter-
national oil and interest rate shocks of 1978-9. As loans had been contracted 
at floating rates, interest rates leaped from 5.8% in 1979 to a crippling 15.1% 
in 1980 on a debt of $18.5bn (Palairet, 2007). Yugoslavia was thus seized by 
debt crisis.
The growing monetary (foreign exchange) constraint on the financing of 
capital investment promoted dollarization, that is, the substitution of the cur-
rency in which domestic foreign liabilities are denominated for the local curren-
cy, as a store of value, unit of account and means of payment. From 1978, the 
central bank acquired commercial bank foreign currency deposits in exchange 
for cheap dinar credits. The transition to foreign currency backed domestic 
borrowing flowed naturally from the export of labour to Western Europe (to 
cover the structural trade deficit), whose remittances from 1963 encouraged 
domestic saving in foreign currencies and provided the basis for foreign cur-
rency bank lending to clients to finance imports. The new system enabled the 
central bank to accumulate foreign currency reserves to settle foreign liabilities 
without creating new debt.  Evolving out of the practice of issuing central bank 
money against foreign currency deposits, the latter became the dominant 
component of liquid assets in Yugoslavia and close substitutes for state-backed 
credit money (Lahiri, 1991). 
In line with the ‘Washington Consensus’, successive IMF structural adjust-
ment programmes (1982-85 and 1989-90) sought to control the money sup-
ply by targeting inflation (and later through fixed exchange rates) combined 
with price and capital account liberalisation. The ambition of monetary policy 
was to check inflationary pressures; to prevent currency overvaluation from 
cutting into exports and thus interest payments. However, the combination 
of monetary restrictions and exclusion from international money markets, to-
gether with the transfer of export surpluses abroad in the form of debt service, 
representing a net outflow of income of $2.1bn in the period 1982-6 (Dyker, 
1990), caused a slump in investment of -37.2% in the years 1979-85 (Lydall, 
1989). Lydall (1989) estimates that between 1979 and 1985 total social prod-
uct actually declined at an annual rate of 0.9%. Overnight the entire produc-
tive sector was pushed into illiquidity, and after 1985 into net deficit, reaching 
a staggering 29% of the value of total social product in 1989 (Palairet, 2001). 
Enterprises responded by shifting this monetary constraint upon the financing 
of production. Endogenous demand for credit money was accommodated by 
the banks, forcing the central bank as lender of last resort to monetise en-
terprise and bank deficits, and in turn accommodate an inflationary wave of 
credit creation (Gedeon, 1985-6, Chowdhury, et al., 1990). With further fuel 
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added by currency devaluation, inflation began to spiral out of control and 
monetary policy struggled to keep the rate of devaluation ahead of the rate of 
depreciation: between 1980 and 1988, the dinar lost about 60% of its value 
per annum, while the rate of inflation rose to more than 75% per annum (Lyd-
all, 1989). Given the failure to make internal adjustments equivalent to growing 
external liabilities, there was only one remaining alternative; namely seignior-
age, or the appropriation of purchasing power by the state due to its power 
to issue legal tender. This inflation tax replaced foreign finance as the source 
of enterprise liquidity, representing a significant distribution from households 
to enterprises in the form of loans at an annual rate of 4.4% of total social 
product (Lahiri, 1991). It also underwrote currency mismatch, that is mount-
ing losses on the foreign currency deposits of commercial banks following ex-
change rate devaluation. The practice of issuing central money by acquiring 
foreign currency deposits meant that depreciation had an amplifier effect on 
liquidity, further stimulating inflation. Eventually money began to malfunction 
as a store of value with the onset of hyperinflation of 2719% in 1989.
Chronic inflation accelerated “dollarization”, as expectations of devaluation 
induced households and businesses to hold increasing proportions of their li-
quidity in foreign currency deposits, whose dinar value increased with devalu-
ation. But, as we saw above, it was not the cause. Pace Friedman, inflation 
is not always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon, in the sense of the 
quantity theory where money stock determines prices. If, as in our case, an 
endogenous expansion in the quantity of credit money fails to realise a cor-
responding expansion in commodity production due to supply cuts, and the 
central bank monetises the resulting losses, then the resulting ‘extra money’ 
(de Vroey, 1984) is inflationary, central bank money presenting a ‘pseudo-
validation’ of supply (de Brunhoff, 1981).  The state can only ratify, at variable 
cost, a creation of money which it does not instigate (de Brunhoff, 1986). 
Inflation, like dollarization, can only be understood in relation to a monetary 
economy of production, where the monetary constraint of the social validation 
of private labours in commodity exchange may be deferred by credit but not 
superseded. Dollarization tendencies were endogenous to a ‘real economy’ 
dependent on foreign currency imports where credit money was increasingly 
issued through the acquisition of foreign currency deposits. But it was mon-
etary policy that in the guise of price stability intensified dollarization: through 
its inflationary ‘socialisation’ of the monetary constraint in order to continue 
repayment of the external debt it ended up destroying social trust in domestic 
money as a store of value. 
3. monetary policy and reGional FinancialiSation in the 2000S 
The defence of the value of credit money and thus money capital is the 
corner stone of regional financialisation and involves some combination of cen-
tral bank independence, inflation targeting, fixed exchange rates and capital 
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account liberalisation. As we have seen, this package was already institutional-
ised in Yugoslavia in the 1980s. In this period inflation targeting sought to man-
age exchange rate devaluation in order to produce a surplus of export earnings, 
while in the post-Yugoslavia in the 2000s it supervised fixed exchange rates 
designed to preserve the value of imported credit money and loan capital. This 
difference was itself the product of the earlier form of inflation targeting, which 
had deprived the productive sector of import goods and monetised the result-
ing deficits, before collapsing in a spiral of inflation and currency substitution. 
The continuity between the two periods was masked by the official ideology of 
‘the transition’  which held that the problem was the ‘liquidity hunger’  of the 
socialist firm and the irresponsible propensity of state spending to monetise 
‘soft budget constraints’ (Kornai, 1992). 
In fact at stake was a new round of forced opening to foreign capital flows 
in order to repay inherited enterprise debt. Monetary policy now gave up try-
ing to walk a tightrope between making exports competitive internationally 
and preserving the value of money as unit of account and means of payment. 
The value of dollarized credit money would be king and the productive sector 
would suffer the consequences of expensive credit and overvalued currencies. 
The monetary system would be geared not to financing productive investment 
but to attracting flows of money capital to finance private consumption, and to 
supervising the circuit of credit money. The ambition of fixed exchange rates, 
the lynchpin of regional financialisation, was to prevent: on the one hand, the 
depreciation of national currencies so as to avert the revaluation of domestic 
foreign liabilities; and, on the other, appreciative pressures building up due to 
large capital inflows. High real interest rates and fixed exchange rates were 
designed to attract foreign credits, enabling the borrowing needed to pay for 
imports and cover current account deficits. However, expensive money acted 
as a disincentive to investment in the real economy, while overvalued curren-
cies made exports uncompetitive. 
Under these conditions, in the first phase of privatisation in the 1990s, 
borrowing against assets and then defaulting on the loans became a way of 
converting illiquid capital assets into money and money capital (Toporowski, 
2012). This was a continuation of the endogenous creation of uncovered and 
involuntary credit money by enterprises in the 1980s, but under conditions 
of private appropriation of capital gains. It continued the practice of transfer-
ring and socialising the monetary constraint on the accumulation of (money) 
capital. Since Yugoslav banks were directly controlled by member enterprises, 
including loss-making firms, the huge losses of the banking system ($13bn 
by 1991) were in fact equivalent to the uncovered losses of enterprise bank 
founders (Uvalić, 1992). In the 1990s, the Croatian banks continued to roll-
over non-performing loans of nationalised founder enterprises and create new 
enterprise deposits through the accumulation of foreign liabilities; while the 
state continued to socialise enterprise losses by repeatedly bailing out the 
banking system.  In Serbia, the banks rolled over founder member debts while 
directors siphoned off enterprise assets and laundered them as hard curren-
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cy exports via offshore banks, thereby piling up major new uncovered losses 
(Palairet, 2000).  In turn, the accumulated foreign currency liabilities could 
only be settled through the sale of virtually the entire regional banking system 
to foreign buyers, through capital account liberalisation and thus the extraver-
sion of the financial system.2
The conversion of company assets into offshore money hoards accelerated 
in the 2000s. Between 2001 and 2010, an incredible $84.5 billion in “illicit 
financial flows” is estimated to have left the region, of which Serbia’s share 
was $51 billion (Kar and Freitas, 2012). The stage was set for a new form of 
financial accumulation. Orchestrated by the foreign banks, it articulated the 
conversion of fixed assets into money capital with the integration of house-
holds into financial markets. In the 2000s mortgage loan growth led to rising 
asset prices, while access to foreign financial markets enabled domestic com-
panies to turn over loans in financial assets; in turn, the ‘wealth effect’ of rising 
asset prices spurred the expansion of retail consumer loans and speculative 
investments. The outcome was a form of Toporowski’s (2000) ‘capital market 
inflation’, centred on the real estate market.  Interest rate differentials set Eu-
rozone money capital flows in motion and completed the credit money circuit 
as arbitrage profits repatriated by the foreign banks. The economics of Marx’s 
(1991) “fictitious capital” – that is, the capitalisation of money revenues based 
on the rate of interest, titles to future values deriving from the virtual liquidation 
of the productive sector – was conditioned by the contradictions of the fixed 
exchange rate regime, which both drew in interest-bearing capital and acted 
as a disincentive to investment in the real economy.3 This was an unproductive 
model of economic growth completely dependent on the external dynamics 
of international financial flows, collapsing with the great financial crisis. The 
region is once gripped by debt crisis.4 
3.1. Subordinate FinancialiSation and world money
In line with the Washington Consensus, regional governments have stockpiled 
foreign reserves in order to make provisions for exchange rate and interest rate 
risk, that is reversal of short term capital flows to the banking sector, and to ward 
off appreciative pressures. Following the quantity theory of money, central banks 
accumulated foreign currency reserves by sterilising excess liquidity caused by 
foreign currency imports. In our terms, central banks sought to control the rate 
2 For example, in Croatia the cost to the state of restructuring the bad debts of the newly privatised 
banking system amounted to 31% of GDP by 1999 (Živković, 2015). 
3 In Serbia industrial production in 2010 was barely 50% of 1990 levels, while in Croatia it was still 
only slightly above 90%. Croatian exports shrivelled from 40% of GDP in 1987 to 19.5% in 2010 
and from 39.2% to 24.7% of GDP in Serbia over the same period (Živković, 2015).
4 Regional public debt has increased by a magnitude of two to three times in GDP terms since 2008. 
As a proportion of GDP, public debt as of end of 2015 is: Croatia, 87.69%; Slovenia, 83.27%; Serbia, 
77.43%; Montenegro, 66.41%; Bosnia and Herzegovina,  42.18%; Macedonia, 38.59%; Kosovo 13%.
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of conversion of foreign into domestic credit money in order to preserve the 
value of dollarized credit money. Foreign currency purchases however merely in-
creased the liquidity of the banking sector, fuelling a carry trade targeting cross-
currency yield differentials and currency appreciation (Gabor, 2010). Under the 
fixed exchange regime, the money market operations of central banks are in 
reality conducted with foreign banks. Due to credit dollarization, interest rate 
policy is ineffective in managing money market liquidity (Tatomir, 2009), while 
exchange rate market interventions have a perverse tendency to increase it. Ad-
ministrative limitations (“financial repression”) are of little help since they are 
subverted by direct cross-border lending by parent banks to corporations. The 
central bank is reduced to a bag man to the foreign currency carry trade.
The interest of the concept of ‘subordinate financialisation’ is that it links 
the resulting outflow of capital to the role of world money, the dollar, in anchor-
ing the international financial flows underpinning financialisation (Lapavitsas, 
2013). Reserve accumulation is the hoarding of the dollar as world money to 
enable participation in world trade (means of payment) or to insure against 
or facilitate financial flows (store of value and means of payment) (Lapavitsas, 
2013) It is the acquisition of promises by the US government to pay an intrinsi-
cally valueless dollar for every nominal dollar of its debt. As a form of interna-
tional seigniorage it represents a (virtually) interest free form of official lending 
to the US, which enables the US to run a record trade deficit, and finances 
US capital exports. From another perspective, while they are hoarded in cen-
tral bank vaults as international reserves, or circulate only within dollarized 
countries, or within dollar-denominated international markets as international 
means of payment, dollars are unable to purchase US goods and thus repre-
sent imports to the same nominal dollar value into the US (Carchedi, 1991).
3.2. world money and reGional dollarization 
These properties of world money are a useful starting point for under-
standing currency substitution, or ‘dollarization’. In what follows we distinguish 
between unofficial dollarization, where assets are denominated or held in a 
foreign currency even if that currency is not legal tender; semi-official dollariza-
tion, or officially bi-monetary systems, where the foreign currency is accepted 
as a second legal tender; and official dollarization where the national currency 
is replaced by a foreign currency. In ex- and post-Yugoslavia all these forms 
of ‘dollarization’ have at different times been present, representing forms of 
dependency on the Dollar, Deutsche Mark, and latterly the Euro as secondary 
international reserve currencies.
3.2.1. oFFicial dollarization
Countries like Montenegro and Kosovo that adopt the euro become part 
of the Eurozone monetary system even though they remain outside both the 
EU and the Eurozone; they are outer peripheries (Becker, 2007). But, as in 
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the case of official dollarization in Latin America (e.g. Ecuador and El Salva-
dor), there is by definition no central bank or lender of last resort. The local 
central bank can neither print euros nor share in euros newly issued by the 
ECB. The supply of money is solely determined by the balance of payments. 
The dollarized country must find a way to earn euros either by exporting or 
borrowing. Hence it does not benefit from either ‘national’ or ‘international’ 
Euro seigniorage in the way members of the Eurozone do. Quite the contrary, 
it cannot devalue against the Eurozone, and external adjustments have a direct 
impact on the money supply. Like the countries of the Eurozone periphery, dol-
larized regional economies must save on labour costs; or export labour to the 
Eurozone (as Kosovo does in large numbers). The expansion of credit money 
depends in practice on the lending strategies of foreign-owned banks, on the 
significant interest rate spread on Eurozone and domestic interest rates.  It is 
particularly ironic then that the aim of currency substitution was to construct 
independent and sovereign monetary spaces: monetary policy has no meaning 
here. In fact dollarization is a form of international seigniorage, to the value of 
the difference between Eurozone interest rates and domestic interest rates; a 
carry trade in the legal tender that removes exchange-rate risk for the lender 
and transfers interest rate risk to the borrower. 
3.2.2. unoFFicial dollarization
In the case of ‘unofficial dollarization’ the national currency is retained, but 
household saving and bank lending, and public sector and/or private sector 
liabilities are in the international reserve currency. Private credits and depos-
its in the region are Euroised, that is, the majority of loans are denominated 
in Euros or indexed to the Euro.5 The basis of this form of dollarized lending 
to households and companies is two-fold. Firstly, the historic lack of social 
trust in national currencies (inflationary expectations) as stores of value, the 
outcome of the processes outlined in section 2.1 above; that is, foreign banks 
took advantage of the fact that household savings continued to be in foreign 
currency to market foreign currency denominated credits.6 Secondly, the fact 
that foreign bank lending did not depend on the collection of deposits, but 
on external financing, necessitated the transfer of exchange-rate risk through 
foreign currency lending.7
5 In 2012, 72% of total loans (including indexed loans) in Croatia and 68% in Serbia were in foreign 
currencies (Becker and Ćetković, 2015).
6 For domestic borrowers, the attractiveness of high risk foreign currency instruments rested on lower 
interest rates (than domestic currency loans) and expectations that exchange rates would continue to 
appreciate, or remain fixed to the Euro. In the crisis, the dramatic appreciation of the Swiss Franc and 
the depreciation of the Serbian dinar against the Euro, and thus the vertiginous increase in the value 
of debt in local currencies, have transferred a share of foreign bank losses and risk to respectively, 
Croatian and Serbian households and businesses.
7 In the 2000s, foreign currency credits far outstripped growth in domestic deposits, resulting in a 
dangerous increase in the regional domestic loan to deposit ratio (Becker and Ćetković, 2015).
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In Serbia, Croatia, Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, dollarization is 
orchestrated and promoted by unofficial or official fixed exchange regimes and 
is also characterised by a complete loss of monetary sovereignty. Monetary 
policy aims to build up foreign currency reserves to back the peg against the 
Euro and to prevent inflation from undermining monetary stability. As credit, 
money assumes two forms: as a unit of accounting for loans and debts de-
nominated in a given accounting currency; and as a means of payment for final 
settlement (de Brunhoff, 2005). Monetary policy in fact constructs the (fixed 
exchange-rate) framework in which the international reserve currency, that is 
state-backed credit money, can function as Marx’s general equivalent, ena-
bling the convertibility of national units of account, and more particularly the 
conversion of different credit monies, and thus of means of ‘deferred’ payment 
into means of circulation. For the purpose of the exchange rate anchor is to 
denominate a debt economy in Euros, to enable the international reserve cur-
rency to overcome the risk and uncertainty inherent in the salto mortale from 
one currency, formed under historically and territorially specific conditions of 
production and circulation, to another, that is, operate as if the international 
reserve currency were the general measure of value internal to the domestic 
market, precisely to become (quasi) world money. It is to enable the interna-
tional reserve currency to function as means of payment, and thus as loan 
capital, free from exchange rate risk; to smoothly operate as unit of account 
and store of value, untroubled by inflationary pressures; and, consequently, to 
enable credit money to complete its circuit. Finance capital exports from the 
EU are furnished with a formally stable, risk free environment. The currency 
board system of managing fixed exchange rates – in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
- based on the full convertibility on demand of the money supply into the 
referent foreign currency, makes clear what is at stake: the operation of the 
foreign currency as close substitute for domestic money (state-backed credit 
money), enabling its conversion as international means of payment into do-
mestic means of payment and circulation, that is, currency substitution. This 
also indicates the continuing fragmentation of post-Yugoslav monetary spaces, 
and inability of domestic money to perform key functions of money.
Credit money appears as a closed circuit of financial transactions, as if 
money were simply a unit of account with a use value. However credit money 
as deferred means of payment introduces the notion of time, transforming the 
simultaneous relation of exchange into one between creditor and debtor (de 
Brunhoff, 2005). Therefore unexpected events (e.g. sudden shifts in exchange 
and interest rates, in asset prices, or settlement difficulties) may cause it to 
malfunction as money, as general means of exchange (de Brunhoff, 2005). 
The relative stability of the value of money over time is the precondition for 
the completion of the circuit of credit money, and for monetary and financial 
stability more generally. As such, monetary policy must rule ultra vires any 
temptation to devalue against the international unit of account: causing the 
value of foreign assets in domestic currency to depreciate, domestic foreign 
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liabilities to revalue, and immediately spilling over into a banking crisis. Fixed 
exchange rates allow the banks to transfer exchange rate risk, by shifting the 
currency mismatch between liabilities and assets onto the borrower, turning 
inter-money risk (exchange-rates) into the inter-temporal risk (interest-rates) 
of default, and enabling credit money to appear precisely as a unit of account 
within a closed circuit. The system of currency substitution, by formally ruling 
out devaluation or default, has one overriding aim; that foreign credit money 
complete its circuit and extinguish itself, that debts are repaid at full value.
3.2.3. dollarization, criSiS dynamicS and lender oF laSt reSort
However in a dollarized credit system credit money no longer represents a 
promise to pay the liabilities of the central bank. In a financial crisis, as the quality 
of bank assets deteriorates, credit promises to pay are devalued, a liquidity crisis 
breaks out, hard cash rules, and banks prefer to hoard money, causing a credit 
crunch. Credit money rests on the operation of central bank money as the obliga-
tory means of payment backed by state debt. However regional central banks are 
severely constrained in providing emergency liquidity to banks when the credit 
system breaks down, because banks need liquidity injections in foreign currency. 
Since they have in effect ceded control over the management of aggregate credit-
flows to the vagaries of international financial flows, extraverted the financial sys-
tem, they cannot act as the lender of last resort to the banking system. Witness 
the Vienna Initiative of 2009 between the IFIs, the European Commission and the 
international banks that parent banks maintain their exposure and recapitalise 
their subsidiaries in the ‘emerging Europe’ region. Under the agreement, it is for 
the home central banks of the parent bank groups to provide emergency foreign 
currency liquidity to subsidiaries, and thus in the final instance the ECB, to per-
form the lender of last resort function, while the role of regional governments is to 
defend the exchange rate peg in order to prevent an uncontrolled devaluation of 
foreign bank domestic assets and a revaluation of domestic private sector liabili-
ties. Thus far, the Initiative has prevented a systemic regional banking failure, but 
not negative rates of lending, that is capital outflow to settle liabilities with parent 
banks and a regional credit crunch. The reversal of capital flows constantly threat-
ens inherently weak regional currencies with devaluation – for example, in the 
case of Serbia, where the currency has lost 40% of its value since the crisis – and 
the revaluation of external foreign liabilities. Euroisation thus radically transforms, 
intensifies and volatilises crisis dynamics, depriving governments of the monetary 
and fiscal instruments to address macroeconomic imbalances and currency mis-
matches. As in the Eurozone periphery, since exchange rates cannot adjust, wages 
and social spending must be internally devalued, causing a collapse in demand 
and rising external and public euroised debt.8 The imperative to preserve the value 
8 By 2015, Croatian real GDP had contracted for six consecutive years, the second longest recession 
in the EU after Greece. Since 2008 the region has experienced a double dip recession following 
directly from that in the Eurozone.
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of credit money and thus money capital takes place at the expense of the destruc-
tion of commodities (Marx, 1991). No other alternative is possible under the fixed 
exchange rate system, which is also to say that there is no independent monetary 
policy. As in the case of official dollarization, the countries of unofficial dollariza-
tion, although outside the Eurozone, remain dependent on the dynamics of the 
Eurozone credit system of which they are also outer peripheries and of the willing-
ness of its central bank(s) to act as lender(s) of last resort. 
3.2.4. oFFicial dollarization in the eurozone
The final form of post-Yugoslav official dollarization is integration into a 
monetary union, the Eurozone, with a central bank acting as lender of last re-
sort. The more competitive Slovenian export model, the exception to regional 
financialisation, was predicated on the rejection of the neo-liberal regime of 
shock therapy, fixed exchange rates and liberalisation of capital controls. Its 
failure can be seen in the present debt crisis, which we have previously argued 
is in reality a crisis of integration into the Eurozone (Živković, 2015). Following 
monetary integration with the Eurozone, Slovenia was no longer able to de-
value its currency to keep its exports competitive against more technologically 
advanced producers like Germany and so, like the Eurozone periphery, resort-
ed to unsustainable debt-financed growth (Živković, 2015). As in the Eurozone 
periphery, but also in the post-Yugoslav cases of official and unofficial dollariza-
tion, external adjustment through devaluation is ruled out, imposing “internal 
devaluation”. The Slovenian banking crisis has become a sovereign debt crisis 
because the Eurozone is revealed to be but a fixed exchange rate system, that 
is, a monetary and not a fiscal union. With the limitations on the ECB to act as 
a lender of last resort, it has become evident that peripheral debt is in effect 
denominated in a foreign currency. Slovenia is effectively constrained to imple-
ment fiscal policy in a foreign currency, which it must borrow on the terms of 
international financial markets (Papadimitriou and Randall Wray, 2012). This is 
an example of what has been called ‘original sin’, the inability of a country to is-
sue foreign loans in its own currency (Eichengreen, et al., 2007), except that in 
this case exchange rate risk, external devaluation, is transformed into interest 
rate risk, internal devaluation. The position of Slovenia resembles that of of-
ficial dollarization outside the monetary space of the referent currency in that 
fiscal policy depends on the balance of payments and/or foreign borrowing.
4. concluSion
The political economy of the region has for decades sought to transfer and 
socialise the monetary constraint on production. In successive phases and forms, 
credit money has emerged endogenously from the needs of production to defer 
the monetary validation of private labours: from the creation of demand depos-
its by banks, via inflationary redistribution from households, to the conversion 
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of illiquid assets into credit money and flight hoards. However the displacement 
of sale and purchase has always adapted to the external foreign currency credit 
constraint on capital accumulation. Displacement has thus meant preserving 
money as the independent form of value at the expense of both the produc-
tion of commodities and the domestic currency as store of value. Dollarization, 
arising out of the crisis of liquidity of the firm, has enabled the restoration of 
the circuit of credit money, the sine qua non of productive investment and ac-
cumulation, but only on the basis of the liquidation of the productive sector, of 
de-industrialisation. And only in a new form, M-M’, on the basis of the illusion of 
money capital as self-expanding value; in the form of fictitious capital, the source 
of monetary and financial disturbances. However, recurrent monetary and finan-
cial crisis demonstrate that money is not identical with credit, that the monetary 
constraint cannot be superseded. Monetary policy has been confounded by the 
problem of articulating world money, central bank money and private bank de-
posits, and of the validation of a creation of money which it cannot instigate. It 
has internalised the monetary constraint in the form of a framework that enables 
the Euro to function as general equivalent, free from exchange rate or interest 
rate risk. But it has done so only to the extent that it shares the illusion that 
money is identical to credit, that domestic central bank money is the obligatory 
means of payment: an illusion dispelled at the first sign of financial disturbance 
when promises to pay are replaced by demands for hard Euro cash. Neverthe-
less it will persist in this illusion. For the value of credit money and thus money 
capital must be preserved against devaluation or default: the valorisation of ficti-
tious capital, or austerity, must take place at the expense of the destruction of 
commodities and the devaluation of labour-power.
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